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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. and Canadian dairy industries have been protected from foreign competition
for decades.  The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade liberalization forced Canada and the
United States to replace their very restrictive  import quotas with tariffs.  However, the tariffs
on dairy products are high enough to leave each countries complex milk marketing system
largely  intact (Meilke  and van Duren  1995, IATRC).  The recent  challenge to Canada's
tariffs, by the United  States, on  dairy  and poultry  products has the potential to upset the
current trading arrangement.  The outcome  of the challenge  will not be known for several
months (Meilke; Martin).
Nonetheless, the warm winds of trade liberalization  are gathering speed and the dairy
industries  in  Canada  and  the United  States  will  not  be  able  to lean  against  this  wind
indefinitely.  A first step towards  increased market integration might be liberalized trade in
milk and/or dairy products within the current, or an expanded NAFTA agreement (Meilke
and  van  Duren  1996).  Partial  trade  liberalization  has  several  disadvantages  from  the
perspective  of Canada.  Dairy product prices in Canada and the United States are well above
world  market  levels  and  Canada's  are  significantly  above  those  in  the  United  States.
Continental free trade would reduce Canada's prices to U.S. levels. Canadian prices would
decrease because of the large size of the U.S. dairy industry compared to the North American
market.  Moreover,  North  American  trade  liberalization  would not  provide  the  general
equilibrium price increases that would follow from multilateral trade liberalization (Graham,
et al.; Meilke and Larue;  Roningen; Roningen and Dixit).  As a result, adjustment costs in
Canada  from free  trade with the United States may be large.  In fact, adjustment  costs  in
Canada  may  be  larger  than  they  would  be  from  free  trade  with  all  industrial  market
economies.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the factors that determine the direction  and
the size of trade flows in milk and  dairy products between Canada  and the United States,
with North  American  trade liberalization.  By  identifying  the key economic  factors,  theProceedings
importance  of various  assumptions  necessary  in modelling the  Canadian  milk market are
exposed.  Free  trade  is analyzed  with a static,  nonspatial, partial  equilibrium model.  The
model employs parameter estimates  derived from a literature  survey.  The literature survey
is helpful  in identifying several estimation problems and in providing a range of estimates
for essential  parameters.  The results  from the  economic model  and the literature  survey
provide a guide  for future research.
BUILDING  BLOCKS
Seven key building blocks are necessary  for the construction of any  economic model
of the Canadian dairy sector (Agriculture  Canada 1980;  Stonehouse and Kizito; Cozzarin).
These  building  blocks  include:  1) the  marginal  cost  of producing  milk;  2)  the  supply
elasticity of milk; 3) the shut-down price for milk production;  4) the  demand elasticity for
fluid milk; 5) the demand elasticity  for industrial milk;  6)  the difference  between Canadian
and  U.S.  processing  margins;  and  7) the landed price of U.S.  milk  and dairy products  in
Canada.
Marginal Cost of Producing Milk
Supply management  involves setting a producer price, based on a cost of production
formula, and restricting the level of production to the quantity that is demanded at this price.
Since  the  1970s  a  number  of key  agricultural  sectors  (dairy,  poultry,  eggs)  have  been
regulated under Canada's supply management policies.  The economic implications of  supply
management  are well known (Barichello,  1981); Stonehouse; Barichello  and Cunningham-
Dunlop; Forbes, Hughes and  Warley;  and Schmitz  and  Schmitz).  Supply  control policies
ensure a sizeable income transfer from consumers  to producers of these  commodities.  The
welfare gains to producers,  however, are outweighed by the welfare  losses to consumers.
Figure 1 illustrates the net welfare loss due to Canadian dairy policy1. Without supply
control, the equilibrium price is  Pe and the quantity  demanded and supplied at this price is
Qe.  However,  supply control  restricts output to Q, resulting in a demand price of Pd  and a
supply price  (marginal  cost) of  Ps.  The difference  between  the two prices (Pd  -1 ) is the
annual  rental rate for quota.  The welfare loss is area ABC.
The  departure  from  marginal  cost  pricing  is  a  distinguishing  feature  of  supply
management.  The  size of the departure  from marginal cost pricing is a key element in  1)
determining the size  of the  efficiency  losses, and  2) determining  the size of the impact of
trade liberalization.  During the past 15  years many attempts have been made to measure the
Figure  1 has been simplified  by assuming there is only one type of milk that fetches
only one price.
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departure  from marginal cost pricing in the Canadian dairy industry.  Some of these efforts
involve accounting procedures.  Others involve the statistical estimation of cost relationships.
Each approach has strengths  and weaknesses.
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The  most  direct approach,  to obtain  a value  for marginal  cost,  is  to  use  cost  of
production survey data.  Cost of production data is used to compute the average cost of milk
production.  It is then assumed that an estimate of average variable cost provides  a crude
approximation to marginal cost (Barichello  1981; Barichello and Stennes). Although the cost
of production approach  is simple, it has several  drawbacks.  First, unit costs of production
vary considerably between farms due to variations in size, technology, and location.  Second,
because average costs vary substantially  by output level,  it is important that sample farms be
representative  and that the sample  includes  the  largest  firms  in the  industry.  Third, the
opportunity costs of farm supplied  inputs (family  labour and returns to management  and
equity  capital)  are  unknown  and  difficult  to  proxy.  Fourth,  if  farm  production  is
characterized by joint production of multiple outputs, using shared inputs, cost allocation
becomes arbitrary.  Finally, under supply management,  there is an incentive  for farmers to
inflate input usage and reported  costs, since these are used in determining their administered
price.
If there was a rental market for production  quota then milk production would move
from inefficient producers to  efficient producers, over time.  The rental rate of quota also
would be directly observable.  If the rental rate is known, a well behaved supply function can
be derived from the profit function (or restricted profit function in the short-run).  Once the
supply  function  is estimated the departure  from marginal  cost at any  output level  can be
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determined2. However,  there is no rental market for Canadian milk quota and the rental rate
is not observed.  Instead,  dairy quotas  are exchanged  as capital assets and confer the right to
produce  and  market milk  indefinitely.  In this  situation, two  alternative  strategies  can  be
pursued to overcome  the problem of estimating the milk supply function.
Another  strategy  to  follow  in  determining  marginal  cost  is to exploit  the  duality
between  profit  and  cost  functions.  By  using farm-level  data  it  is possible  to  estimate
econometrically  a joint cost function.  The marginal and average  cost of milk production can
be derived from the cost function  and then used to determine  the departure  from marginal
cost pricing.  This approach does not require any information on quota rental rates.
Moschini (1988a) used the joint cost function approach to analyze  aggregate supply
response  with supply management.  He also estimated  a joint cost function for the Ontario
dairy  sector using farm-level cost data from  1980 to 1986 (Moschini  1988b).  The departure
from marginal  cost was estimated  as the difference  between the farm  level milk price and
marginal cost (and average cost) at the optimum long-run scale of  production. At the optimal
output level (which was about  5,000 hi of  milk per year), the minimum value of average cost
was estimated to  be $26.10/hl.  The average price of industrial  and  fluid milk during the
study  period were  $30.70/hl  and  $36.90/hl,  respectively.  Thus,  for industrial  milk,  the
departure from marginal cost pricing was  15  percent. For fluid milk,  the extent of departure
was  over 29 percent (Moschini  and Meilke).
Milk quota  confers the  permanent right  to produce milk  and to sell  it at privileged
prices.  The production rights provide a stream of annual returns to the producer.  According
to  the capital  asset pricing model,  the  capitalized  quota value  is equal  to the  sum of the
discounted  future returns.  That is,
(1)  Vo=R/i
where (V 0) is the current  capital value of the asset, (R) is the average annual return on the
investment  and  (i)  is the average  discount rate.3 The  return,  R,  can be  interpreted  as  the
difference between price and marginal  cost.
If two of the three variables in equation  (1) are known, the value of the third variable
can be derived  from the formula.  Since the capitalized  quota values (V 0's)  are observable,
it is possible to recover  from equation (1) the departure from marginal  cost pricing (R) if the
discount  rate is known.  But what is the  appropriate discount  rate?  In theory,  the discount
rate reflects the riskiness of the asset.  In this case the major risk is that the right to produce
milk  at  privileged  prices  might be  lost  (Lermer  and  Stanbury).  Expected  capital  gains,
expected nominal interest rates and the planning horizon will also  affect the risk assessment.
These  factors  are  difficult to quantify  and  incorporate  into  the choice  of a  discount rate.
2 Babcock and Foster used this approach to determine the marginal  cost of flu-cured
tobacco production  in North Carolina.
3  Note that this simple capitalization formula assumes an infinite planning horizon, no
growth in asset value and zero  covariance between the value of the asset and aggregate
consumption (Varian:368-386).
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Consequently, discount rates as diverse as  0.14 (Veeman)  and 0.32 (Barichello  1984) have
been considered appropriate  to estimate the departure  from marginal  cost pricing.  Even for
assets  as closely related  as fluid milk quota and  industrial milk  quota, estimated  rates of
return vary considerably over time (Moschini and Meilke; Barichello  1995).  A shortcoming
of the capital asset pricing model is that of  the three variables contained in formula (1),  only
one is known with certainty.  The other two variables  are equally difficult to estimate with
precision.
Barichello (1984) has proposed another method to determine  marginal cost using the
capital asset pricing model.  In Ontario, there are markets  for two types of industrial milk
quota, used and unused.  Exactly the same set of policies regulate both markets, but the per
unit values of the quotas are different.  Note, that used quota bought in year (t) can be used
to  ship milk beginning in year,(t+l).  However,  milk can be shipped under unused quota
immediately.  The difference  in value between used and unused quota can be considered a
return  on  investment  in  current  milk  production.  Note that  unlike  imputed  returns  on
investment,  the  return  on  an  investment  in  current  quota  (milk production)  is  market
determined.  The rate of return reflects the riskiness of the asset, nominal interest rates and
the time horizon.  The approach  is analytically simple and empirically appealing.  Obviously,
the nominal discount rate retrieved  in this way will vary over time.  However, it is one of the
few ways to avoid the arbitrary choice of a discount factor.
Hickling used the Barichello approach to retrieve the annual rental rate of milk quota
and the marginal cost of  milk production.  He estimated the departure from marginal cost to
be 43 percent.  Some experts have argued that a departure  of  43 percent is too high (Halpem
et al.). Consequently,  while this is an intuitively appealing approach  to obtain the departure
from marginal cost pricing,  it seems to generate unrealistically high values for the discount
rate.  High discount rates produce implausibly  low marginal cost estimates.
Chen and Meilke have proposed  a dynamic variation on Barichello's approach.  The
authors  estimate  the marginal  cost  of Ontario  milk production  from  1980  to  1991.  The
estimated  marginal  costs  are  consistently  higher  than  those  obtained  using  Barichello's
method  (in  1985-86  marginal cost were  $22/hl vs. $12/hl)
4. Consequently,  the estimated
departures  from marginal  cost pricing are consistently lower in Chen and Meilke's study than
similar estimates  obtained using Barichello's approach.
The choice  of any  single  marginal  cost estimate  is fraught with  difficulties  and  is
bound to be controversial.  However,  for empirical analysis  a point estimate is needed and
$33/hl  is  assumed  to be the  margin  cost of producing  the current  quantity  of milk.  The
estimate  of $33/hl  is consistent  with  cost of production  surveys.  Furthermore,  a  $33/hl
marginal  cost implies a discount rate of 20 percent,  based on  1993  Ontario used  industrial
milk quota values.  A 20 percent discount rate is in the mid-range of discount rates estimated
by other economists.
4  Unless otherwise  noted all dollar values are in Canadian  currency.
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Supply Elasticities
Information on the departure from marginal  cost pricing provides  one point  on the
underlying  supply function.  It does not describe the  shape of the supply function nor the
responsiveness  of milk  supply  to  free  market  price  changes.  Most  Canadian  studies
involving  supply managed  commodities  borrow  supply elasticity  estimates  from analysis
conducted  using  U.S.  data.  Regulatory  differences  have  introduced  dissimilarities  in the
average size and capital structure of dairy farms in Canada and the United States (Agriculture
Canada  1995a,  USDA).  Identical  supply responses cannot  be expected  in the United  States
and Canada.  Nonetheless, there  are similarities in production practices  and input prices in
the two countries.  As a result, supply elasticities  estimated using U.S. data are indicative of
the responsiveness  of the underlying Canadian  supply function.
Estimated long-run supply elasticities  for milk derived from several U.S.  studies are
presented  in Table  1.  The  estimated  supply  elasticities  vary considerably  across  studies
depending  on the structural characteristics  of the  models, the data sets, the time period of
analysis,  and  the  expectations  mechanism  used.  All  of the  estimated  long-run  supply
elasticities are greater than 0.5,  except for the estimate obtained by Howard and Shumway.
In  four  of the  studies  the  estimated  long-run  supply elasticity  is  greater  than  one.  The
American Agricultural  Economics Associations Task Force on Dairy Marketing Orders in
summarizing their survey of milk supply elasticities came to the conclusion that...  "quite high
long-run supply elasticity,  say more than two, makes  a good deal of economic  sense given
modem dairy production methods (p. 51)" which provides an argument against using a small
supply elasticity  in the Canadian context.
Table 1.  Estimated Long-Run Supply Elasticities for Milk in the United States
Source  Study Period  Supply Elasticitya
Elterich and Masud  1966-78  2.8
Dahlgran  1953-83  1.0(6)-2.0(16)
Thraem and Hammond  1949-78  1.15
Chavas and Klemme  1960-82  0.89(5)-2.46(10)
LaFrance  and de Gorter  1950-80  4.8-8.0
Kaiser et al.  1949-85  0.80  (5)
Howard  and  Shumway  1951-82  0.23
Helmberger  and Chen  1966-90  0.58
a The numbers  in the parentheses  are the number of years allowed  for the indicated  supply
response.
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Shut-Down  Price
Most  economists  pay  little  attention  to  the  price  at  which  the  production  of a
commodity  falls to  zeros.  Policy  changes  typically  involve  small  price  changes  which
seldom push prices near the shut-down point.  However, MacGregor,  et al. did consider the
issue,  in a mathematical  programming  context,  when they  analyzed changes  to Canada's
subsidized rail freight rates. Fox, Roberts and Brinkman discuss a non-linear functional form,
for a supply curve, that allows for an explicit shut-down price without imposing an inelastic
supply response.  In some situations the shut-down price can be important,  especially if price
declines  are expected to be large.  Supply response must become very price elastic as prices
fall close to the shut-down price.
The only source of information about possible shut-down prices for milk production,
are the various cost-of-production  surveys.  Survey  data suggest that for the more "efficient"
farms to produce a hectolitre of milk in  1993-1994, the variable cost was around $23-24/hl
(ODFAP;  OMMB).  The variable cost  estimate included the variable cost of milk and crop
production plus the cost of hired  labour.  Therefore,  a value of $22/hl was selected in this
study  as the price at which Canadian milk production would go to zero,  since some farms
have lower costs than the "average"  figure.
Demand  Elasticities for Fluid and Industrial Milk
Milk is consumed  either in fluid form or as processed products made  from industrial
milk (butter, cheese, yogurt,  ice cream, and skim milk powder).  The demand elasticity  for
each  product  is  different.  By  using  observed  retail  prices,  the  demand  elasticities  for
Canadian dairy products  can be estimated using standard  econometric techniques.
Table 2  contains some direct price elasticities  for fluid milk estimated for the most
part with Canadian data.  The estimates for the United States are included for the purpose of
comparison.  Table 2 shows that most of the elasticity  estimates  for Canada vary between
-0.20 and -0.40.
About 70  percent of the raw  milk produced in  Canada  is used  in processed  dairy
products.  Despite its large share of the raw milk market,  few studies have estimated the price
elasticity of demand for Canadian industrial milk products.  Goddard and Amuah found the
own-price elasticity of demand for butter during the  1973-86 period to be -0.78.  Veeman and
Peng estimated the following  direct price elasticities  for various processed dairy products:
butter (-1.11),  ice cream (-0.62),  yogurt (-0.81),  cottage cheese (-0.21),  cheddar cheese
(-0.66)  and  other cheese  (-1.22).  Moschini  and Moro report  a matrix of  own-price  and
cross-price elasticities of demand for fluid milk, butter, cheese and other dairy products.  The
elasticities estimated by Moschini  and Moro are listed in Table  3.
5 Studies using linear supply  curves with an inelastic  supply response imply there is
positive output at a zero price.
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Table  2.  Estimates of the Own-Price Elasticity  of Demand for Fluid Milk
Source  Study Area & Period  Price Elasticity
Kinnucan and Forker  U.S.  -0.04
Kinnucan  Buffalo, U.S.  -0.73
Thompson and Eiler  U.S.  -0.20
Goddard and Tielu  Ontario:  1971-84  -0.25
Venkateswaren  and Kinnucan  Ontario:  1973-84  -0.19
Stonehouse  and Kizito  Canada:  1971-88  -0.01  (Stnd.)
-0.31  (L-Fat)
Curtin et al.  Canada:  1961-84  -0.24
Agriculture Canada  1980  Canada:  1970-80  -0.02 (Stnd.)
-2.79 (L-Fat)
Goddard  and McCutcheon  Ontario:  1981-89  -0.24
Quebec:  1981-89  -0.23
Goddard  and Tielu  Canada:  1977-94  -0.38
Moschini and Moro  Canada:  1962-88  -0.34
Fang  Ontario  -0.11
Helmberger  and Chen  U.S.:  1966-90  -0.08 (Fluid)
Veeman and Peng  Canada  -0.59 (Stnd.)
-0.11  (L-Fat)
Table 3.  Price Elasticity of Demand for Milk and Milk Products in Canada.
Milk  Butter  Cheese  Other Dairy
Milk  -0.34  0.12  -0.14  0.10
Butter  0.35  -0.92  -0.19  0.46
Cheese  -0.24  -0.11  -0.40  0.39
Other Dairy  0.15  0.24  0.35  -1.02
Source: Moschini  and Moro (1993, p. 89).
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Trade liberalization will affect the prices of all dairy products through a change in raw
milk price.  The price of all dairy products will fall compared to prices of other goods.  The
relative prices of dairy products will change slightly or not at all.  Therefore, total  elasticities
are required.  An estimate  of the "correct"  elasticity  can  be obtained from  Moschini  and
Moro's results by adding  the elasticities  across the rows in Table 3.  Doing this, the total
elasticity for  fluid milk is -0.26 and for butter, cheese and other dairy products -0.30,  -0.36
and -0.28 respectively.
Processing Margins
According  to Industry Science  and Technology Canada, Canadian processing  costs
are  similar  to  those  in  the United States  when  the higher  cost  of raw milk  is excluded.
However, the guaranteed margin to dairy processors, in Canada, is considerably larger than
the one used in the United States to set support prices for butter and skim milk powder( de
Gorter).  Therefore, with free trade, processor margins might get squeezed due to increased
competition.  Reduced  processor  margins  would  be  shared  between  consumers  and
producers.  Elasticities of supply and demand  and arbitrage conditions would determine the
extent of the margin squeeze and the shares allocated to consumers  and processors.  Little is
known  about  the  competitive  conditions  in  the  Canadian  milk  processing  industry.
Moreover,  there is limited information on the supply and demand conditions for processed
dairy products that would be traded under free market conditions (Rude).  A careful analysis
of dairy  product  trade  is well  beyond  the  scope  of this paper.  However,  the  effect  of
lowering the Canadian processing  margin on dairy products  is simulated.
U.S.  Milk Prices
Table  4  shows that the nominal  price of U.S.  industrial  milk has ranged  between
US$11.03/cwt  and US$12.57/cwt.  Transfer costs between the United States and Canada are
assumed to equal US$ 1.00/cwt which is roughly consistent with the findings of de Gorter and
Agriculture  Canada (1995b). Table 4 reveals that most of the variation in the landed value
of U.S. milk ($31.73/hl to $41.02/hl) has resulted from currency fluctuations.  With the U.S.
dollar trading at $1.35-$1.40  the landed price of industrial milk  from the United States  is
about $40/hl.
6 The price  gap between Canadian producer  returns and U.S.  industrial milk
prices  is  $8-$10/hl,  of which $5.43  is the direct federal  subsidy.  Consequently, Canada's
market prices  for industrial milk are not much different from the current landed price of U.S.
milk.  The  price  gap  shown  in  Table  4  assumes  that  Canada  would be  in  a  net  import
6  The price relationships in Table 4 and Table 5 should only be considered  as indicative
of trading prices.  Actual trade would take place between Canada  and low cost producing points
in the Northern  United States.  Especially for fluid milk, prices in the Northern United  States are
below those in the  Southern Milk Marketing  Orders.
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position.  If Canada is exporting milk and dairy products to the United  States, industrial milk
prices would have to fall to about $34/hl, ie. the U.S. price less transfer costs.
Table 4.  A Comparison of Canadian and United States Prices for Industrial Milk,
1980-1994.
US-  Can-  In-  Producer  Plant
Year  Man.  Transfer  Exchange  US-Man  Target  Quota  Ontario_  Net  Prodcer  Direct  Plant Gate  Gate
Mkt.  Price
Price  Costs  Rate  Price  Return  Levy  Fees  Return  Gap _Subsidy  Price Gap  Price  Gap
excl.  incl.
us$/cwt  us$/cwt  c$/us$  c$  c$/hI c  $/hl  c$/hl  c$/hl  c$/hl  c$/hl  c/h  subsidy  subsidy
[1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10]  [11]  [12]
1980  $11.88  $1.00  1.19  $34.79  $35.55  $2.96  $0.48  $32.11  ($2.68)  $6.03  $0.76  ($5.27)
1981  $12.57  $1.00  1.22  $37.58  $38.92  $3.27  $0.64  $35.01  ($2.57)  $6.03  ($4.69)
1982  $12.49  $1.00  1.23  $37.67  $41.33  $4.68  $0.69  $35.96  ($1.70)  $6.03  $3.66  ($2.37)
1983  $12.49  $1.00  1.26  $38.58  $43.24  $5.14  $0.73  $37.37  ($1.21)  $6.03  $4.66  ($1.37)
1984  $12.29  $1.00  1.34  $40.43  $44.65  $6.17  $0.77  $37.71  ($2.71)  $6.03  $4.22  ($1.81)
1985  $11.48  $1.00  1.38  $39.09  $45.64  $6.07  $0.84  $38.73  ($0.36)  $6.03  $6.55  $0.52
1986  $11.30  $1.00  1.36  $37.97  $46.48  $5.35  $0.92  $40.21  $2.24  $6.03  $8.51  $2.48
1987  $11.23  $1.00  1.27  $35.26  $46.77  $4.11  $0.99  $41.68  $6.42  $6.03  $11.51  $5.48
1988  $11.03  $1.00  1.20  $32.77  $47.06  $3.08  $1.06  $42.93  $10.16  $6.03  $14.29  $8.26
1989  $12.37  $1.00  1.17  $35.51  $47.45  $2.91  $1.06  $43.49  $7.98  $6.03  $11.94  $5.91
1990  $12.21  $1.00  1.15  $34.48  $48.69  $3.40  $1.10  $44.19  $9.71  $6.03  $14.21  $8.18
1991  $11.05  $1.00  1.16  $31.73  $49.92  $3.38  $1.23  $45.32  $13.58  $6.03  $18.19  $12.16
1992  $11.88  $1.00  1.26  $36.84  $50.11  $2.10  $1.38  $46.64  $9.80  $6.03  $13.27  $7.24
1993  $11.80  $1.00  1.35  $39.23  $50.84  $1.90  $1.45  $47.49  $8.26  $5.43  $11.61  $6.18
1994  $12.00  $1.00  1.39  $41.02  $52.28  $2.18  $1.45  $48.65  $7.63  $5.43  $11.26  $5.83
[1]  M-W Manufacturing grade milk, 3.5%  fat, calendar year.  Dairy Outlook. USDA.
[2]  Assumed average transfer costs.
[3]  Canadian dollars per  United States dollar, calendar  year.  Medium Term  Outlook. Agriculture  Canada.
[4)  United States  price of manufactured milk  landed  in Canada, Canadian dollars per hectoliter,  calendar year.  Calculated  as (1 +
2)*(3)*2.27.
[5]  Canada target return for industrial milk, dairy year. Medium  Term  Outlook. Agriculture Canada.
[6]  In-Quota levy  on all  milk, dairy year. Medium  Term  Outlook.  Agriculture Canada.
[7]  Ontario Milk  Marketing Board marketing levy, dairy year.  Dairy Statistical Handbook. OMMB.
[8]  Canada net producer return  for milk, dairy year, including direct  federal subsidy.  Calculated  as (5-6-7).
[9]  Gap between  Canadian industrial milk producer returns,  including the direct federal subsidy, and  the M-W  average manufactured  milk
price.
Calculated  as (8-4).
[10] Canada  industrial milk direct federal  subsidy, dairy year.  Medium Term  Outlook. Agriculture  Canada.
[11] Gap  between Canadian industrial  milk price, plant gate, excluding the federal subsidy,  and the M-W average  manufactured milk price.
Calculated  as (5-4).
[12]  Gap between Can. industrial milk  price, plant gate, including the federal subsidy,  and the M-W  average manufactured  milk  price.
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Table 5 lists the  nominal prices  of fluid milk in the United States.  In this  case, the
producer price gap is much larger, ranging from $12-$17/hl,  in recent years.  A reasonable
fluid milk import price is about $43/hl.
Table 5.  A Comparison of Canadian  and United  States  Prices for Fluid  Milk, 1980-1994
In-  Ontario  Plant
Year  US-Fluid  Transfer  Exchange  US-Fluid  Ontario  Quota_ _Ontario__ _Fluid_  __Producer _Gate__
Fluid  Mkt.  Producer  Price
Price  Costs  Rate  Price  Price  Levy  Fees  Return  Price Gap  Gap
us$/cwt  us$/cwt  c$/us$  c$/hl  c$/hl  c$/hl  c$/hl  c$/hl  c$/hl  c$/hl
[1]  [2]  [31  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10]
1980  $13.23  $1.00  1.19  $38.44  $40.11  $0.48  $39.63  $1.19  $1.67
1981  $13.95  $1.00  1.22  $41.40  $43.36  $0.64  $42.72  $1.32  $1.96
1982  $13.80  $1.00  1.23  $41.32  $46.04  $0.69  $45.35  $4.03  $4.72
1983  $13.75  $1.00  1.26  $42.19  $48.23  $0.73  $47.50  $5.32  $6.04
1984  $13.61  $1.00  1.34  $44.44  $51.49  $0.77  $50.72  $6.28  $7.05
1985  $12.90  $1.00  1.38  $43.54  $52.51  $0.84  $51.67  $8.13  $8.97
1986  $12.62  $1.00  1.36  $42.05  $52.51  $0.92  $51.59  $9.54  $10.46
1987  $12.66  $1.00  1.27  $39.38  $52.51  $0.99  $51.53  $12.14  $13.13
1988  $12.36  $1.00  1.20  $36.39  $54.51  $1.06  $53.46  $17.06  $18.12
1989  $13.66  $1.00  1.17  $38.94  $54.45  $1.06  $53.40  $14.46  $15.51
1990  $13.89  $1.00  1.15  $38.87  $56.95  $1.10  $55.85  $16.98  $18.08
1991  $12.30  $1.00  1.16  $35.02  $56.95  $1.23  $55.73  $20.70  $21.93
1992  $13.16  $1.00  1.26  $40.50  $58.94  $1.38  $57.57  $17.06  $18.44
1993  $12.86  $1.00  1.35  $42.47  $59.08  $1.90  $1.45  $55.73  $13.26  $16.61
1994  $13.03  $1.00  1.39  $44.27  $59.83  $2.18  $1.45  $56.20  $11.93  $15.56
[1]  Price of milk eligible for fluid  market, calendar year,  Dairy Outlook.  USDA.
[2]  Assumed  average transfer costs.
[3]  Canadian  dollars  per  United  States dollar, calendar year.  Medium Term Outlook. Agriculture
Canada.
[4}  United  States price of fluid milk landed in Canada,  Canadian  dollars per  hectoliter, calendar  year.
Calculated as (1 +  2)*(3)*2.27.
[5]  Ontario Class  I price for milk,  dairy year.  Medium  Term  Outlook. Agriculture  Canada.
[6]  In-Quota levy on all milk, dairy year.  Medium Term Outlook.  Agriculture Canada.
[7]  Ontario Milk Marketing  Board  marketing levy,  dairy year.  Dairy Statistical Handbook.
OMMB.
[8]  Return  received by Ontario fluid milk producers,  dairy year.  Calculated  as (5-6-7)
[9]  Gap between  average Ontario fluid  milk producer returns  and US  average fluid  milk prices.  Calculated as
(8-4).
[10]  Gap between  average Ontario  fluid milk prices,  plant gate,  and US average fluid milk prices.  Calculated  as
(5-4).Proceedings
THE MODEL
To illustrate  the importance of the economic variables mentioned above a simple two-
good,  synthetic economic  model is constructed.  The model depicts trade between Canada
and  the United  States in  milk  and dairy  products.  It  is  assumed  that Canada  is  a small-
country price-taker.
The model consists of two  consumption  goods:  industrial milk products  and  fluid
milk, produced from a single raw milk input.  While fluid milk would trade in its raw (fluid)
form, industrial  milk is more likely to be traded as processed  dairy products  (butter, skim
milk  powder,  cheese,  ice  cream,  etc.).  The  model  is  calibrated  in  terms  of the  milk
equivalent  of processed product  consumption,  and  constructed  to reproduce  the  1993/94
Canadian dairy year.
Prices, quantities, and the assumed  base values of parameters used for simulation,  are
listed  in Table 6 and Table 7.  All Canadian prices and quantities are based on data,  for the
dairy year,  except for exports of Canadian dairy products (milk equivalents) where data for
calender year  1993 is used.  Similarly, the U.S. prices shown  in Table 6  and Table 7 are for
a calendar rather than  a dairy year.  The  choice  of the base parameter estimates  has been
guided primarily by the  literature review.  A reader may disagree with the choice of the base
parameters.  Therefore,  a range of values are used in the sensitivity  analysis to illustrate the
importance  of various parameter  choices (Table 7).
Model  Specification
The simulation model consists of two linear demand functions and a non-linear supply
function calibrated to representative  prices and quantities. The  demand elasticities  for fluid
and industrial milk demand are set at -0.10 and -0.50.  The industrial milk demand elasticity
is slightly higher than the total elasticities estimated by Moschini and Moro but considerably
lower  than most Marshallian  demand  elasticities  for individual processed  dairy  products.
The elasticities  should be calculated at the processing plant gate (wholesale)  and not at retail,
as are nearly all of  the estimates  in the literature.  Under most conditions, demand elasticities
will be  lower at the wholesale  rather than at the  retail level.  To capture  all  "reasonable"
demand elasticities  sensitivity analysis  is conducted  over the range -0.05 to -0.40 for fluid
milk and from -0.20 to -0.90 for industrial milk (Table  7).  These elasticities  are imposed on
a linear demand curve  at the  1993/94 price-quantity  point.
The  farm  level  supply  elasticity  for milk  has  been  set at  1.0.  Selecting  a supply
elasticity  also requires selecting a length of run to which it applies.  A base period value of
1.0,  should be appropriate  for the  medium run.  A range of values from  0.5 to 2.0  should
capture all expected supply responses  beyond the very short run to the long run.
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Table 6.  1993/1994 Dairy Year - Base Data
[1]  Industrial target return ($/hl)  $50.84
[2]  minus within quota levy ($/hl)  $1.90
[3]  minus marketing board fees  $1.45
minus domestic butter program
[4]  costs  $0.08
Producer Net Return for Industrial Milk ($/hl)  $47.41
[5]  minus direct subsidy  $5.43
Producer Net Market Return for Industrial Milk ($/hl)  $41.98
Industrial target return ($/hl)  $50.84
minus direct subsidy  ($/hl)  $5.43
Price Paid by  Processors for Industrial Milk ($/hl)  $45.41
[6]  plus processor margin  $7.60
Price Guarantee to  Processors  $53.01
[7]  Ontario Fluid Milk Price ($/hl)  $59.08
less over quota  levy  $1.90
less marketing  board fees  $1.45
Producer Net Return for Fluid Milk  $55.73
Ontario Fluid Milk Price ($/hl)  $59.08
plus weighted average processing
[8]  margin  $0.63
Price Received  by  Fluid  Processors  $59.71
[9]  Fluid Milk  Deliveries  (mhl)  30.73
[10]  less skim off  8.16
[11]  Fluid Milk Consumption  22.57
[12]  Industrial  Milk and Cream Deliveries (mhl)  43.27
plus  skim off cream  from fluid
sector (mhl)  8.16
Industrial Milk Supply,  butterfat basis (mhl)  51.43
[13]  Exports of Industrial Products, butterfat basis (mhl)  3.00
[14]  Imports of Industrial Products, butterfat basis  (mhl)  2.63
Net Exports of Industrial Products (mhl)  0.37
Domestic  Consumption  of Industrial Milk and
Cream Products, butterfat basis (mhl)  51.06
United States Milk Price +  Transfer Costs
[15]  Fluid  Milk Price +  transfer  costs  $42.47
Industrial  Milk Price +  transfer
[16]  costs  $39.23
United States Milk Price -Transfer Costs
[17]  Fluid Milk Price -transfer  costs  $36.35
Industrial Milk Price -transfer
[18]  costs  $33.10
[1],  [2],  [5],  [6],  [7],  [8],  [9],  [10],  [11],  [12]  Medium  Term Outlook.  Agriculture  Canada.
[3]  Dairy  Statistical Handbook.  OMMB
[4]  Dairy  Facts and Figures.  Dairy  Farmer's of Canada.
[13], [14]  Figures are for calendar  year 1993.  Dairy Facts and Figures.  Dairy  Farmer's of Canada.
[15], [17]  See table  5.
[16],  [18]  See table  4.Proceedings
Table 7.  Base Parameter Values  and Values  Used in Sensitivity Analysis
PARAMETERS:  Base  Value*  Range  for Sensitivity
Analysis
Demand Elasticity  for Fluid Milk  -0.10  -0.05 to -0.40
Demand Elasticity  for Industrial  Milk  -0.50  -0.20 to -0.90
Supply Elasticity  for all Milk  1.00  0.50 to  2.00
Marginal Cost of Production at Current Output  $33.00/hl  $30.00  to $45.00
Shut-Down Price  $22.00/hl  $20.00  to $28.00
US Fluid Milk Price,  import basis  $43.00/hl  $33.00  to $48.00
US Industrial  Milk Price, import basis  $40.00/hl  $30.00 to $45.00
US Industrial Milk Price,  export basis  $34.00/hl  $30.00 to $45.00
* All values  are expressed  in Canadian dollars.
There  are  two  other  aspects  of the model  that  need  further  elaboration:  (1)  the
functional  form for the  supply curve  and  (2)  the  point on  the curve  to  impose the  supply
elasticity.  The  functional  form selected  in this study is:
(2)  S=  a(  P-  3)
where S  is the quantity supplied.  P is price (marginal cost) and a, P and y  are parameters.
A supply  curve  of this  form permits  the specification  of a shut-down point and the
price  where milk supply goes to zero.  In equation (2), when  P=P supply goes to zero, the
parameter (p) defines the shut-down price.  The parameters  a and y determine the shape of
the curve.
The supply elasticity is  imposed at a marginal cost of $33/hl and a quantity of 74 mhl,
conditional  on the assumed shut-down price of $22/hl.  To test the robustness of the results
to  these  assumptions,  a  sensitivity  analysis  is  conducted.  Shut-down values  are  varied
between $20/hl-$28/hl  and marginal cost values  are varied between $30/hl and $45/hl.
Processing Margin
The  base  model  is  constructed  on  the  assumption  that  the  processing  margin  in
Canada is a competitive margin.  Consequently,  if Canadian processing plants pay the same
price  for raw milk as their U.S.  counterparts,  Canadian processed dairy products would be
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priced competitively  with the processed product from the United States.  To  simulate the
possibility that Canadian processing margins might be reduced with trade liberalization, the
effect of reducing the Canadian  processing margin from $7.60/hl to $3.80/hl is examined.
U.S.  Milk Prices
Prices  for  fluid  and  industrial  milk  produced  in  the  United  States  are  needed  to
simulate the model.  With the U.S.  dollar trading at $1.35-$1.40,  the landed price of milk
produced in the United States is about $40/hl, the base value chosen for industrial  milk.  The
value selected for fluid milk is $3/hl higher at $43/hl.  A drop in the American milk price to
$22.70/hl (US$10/cwt)  plus a weaker U.S. dollar of $1.25,  could push landed prices down
to $30/hl.  Hence, a range of landed values for U.S. milk from $30/hl to $45/hl are simulated.
Values below $40/hl are  the most  probable.  In all simulations  it is assumed  that Canada
could price fluid milk at the import competitive price of $43/hl, even when it is a net exporter
of dairy products.
THE RESULTS
Table 8 describes the consequences of freer trade under two alternative scenarios, and
compares these results to the current policy situation.  Base  1 assumes that producers react
to the blend price  in making  their supply decisions.  In Base  2, producers  are assumed to
react  to  the  industrial  milk  price  - which  is  the  marginal  output  price.  Under  both
assumptions Canadian milk output increases from the base level of 74 mhl.  In Base  1 output
increases to 81.3 mhl (blend price scenario) and In Base 2 output rises to 79.1 mhl (industrial
milk price scenario).  Output increases in both cases despite a producer price decline of 25-30
percent following the removal of supply restrictions.  As a result of a reduced market price,
the  demand  for  fluid milk  increases  by  2.7  percent  and  the demand  for  industrial  milk
increases by about 10 percent.
In Base 1, Canada is a small net exporter of  milk (1.53 mhl) and industrial milk prices
are pushed  down to the  export floor  of $34/hl.  The  blend price  in Base  1 is reduced  to
$36.57/hl, compared to $49.95  under supply control.  Under Base 2, Canada is self-sufficient
in milk production and net trade in milk products is zero.  Autarky industrial and blend prices
rise from Base 1 levels to $35.41  and  $37.64/hl.
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Table 8.  Current and Free Trade Policy  Results: Base Period Variable and Parameter
Values
FREE  FREE
VARIABLE  UNITS  CURRENT  TRADE  TRADE
POLICY BASE  BASE  1  BASE 2
value  value  %  change  value  %  change
Fluid Milk Demand  mhl  22.57  23.18  2.7  23.18  2.7
Industrial  Milk Demand  mhl  51.06  56.56  10.8  55.88  9.4
Total Domestic Milk Demand  mhl  73.63  79.73  8.3  79.05  7.4
Total Milk Supply  mhl  74.00  81.26  9.8  79.05  6.8
Net Exports of Milk Products  mhl  0.37  1.53  313.5  0  -100.0
Fluid Milk Producer  Price  $/hl  $55.73 $  43.00  -22.8 $  43.00  -22.8
Industrial  Milk Producer Price  $/hl  $47.41  $  34.00  -28.3 $  35.41  -25.3
Producer Blend  Milk Price  $/hl  $49.95  $  36.57  -26.8 $  37.64  -24.6
Price of Fluid Milk, plant gate  $/hl  $59.08  $  43.00  -27.2 $  43.00  -27.2
Price of Industrial Milk, plant
gate  $/hl  $50.84  $  34.00  -33.1  $  35.41  -30.4
Wholesale Price of Fluid
Milk, ex plant  $/hl  $59.71 $  43.63  -26.9 $  43.63  -26.9
Wholesale price of Industrial
Milk Products, ex plant  $/hl  $53.01 $  41.60  -21.5 $  43.01  -18.9
US Fluid Milk Price, import
basis  $/hl  $43.00 $  43.00  $  43.00
US Industrial  Milk Price,
export  basis  $/hl  $34.00 $  34.00  $  34.00
Gross Revenue  from Milk
Sales  mil. dol.  $3,461.30 $  2,971.68  -14.1  $  2,975.44  -14.0
Rental  Value of Production
Quota  mil. dol.  $1,248.82 $  0.00  $  0.00
Gross Revenue  less Rental
Value of Quota  mil. dol.  $2,212.48 $  2,971.68  34.3 $  2,975.44  34.5
Gross revenue from milk sales, excluding the direct federal subsidy, is $3,461  million
under the current policy.  Gross revenue is estimated to fall by about  14 percent under free
trade to just under $3 billion.  However,  the annual rental value of production quota, under
the base assumptions  is $1,249  million.  Deducting the $1,249 million from gross revenue
leaves  about  $2.2 billion to cover production costs  and to provide a return to non-quota
assets.  This  "net"  return  is  34 percent  less than  under the  free trade  assumptions.  The
opportunity cost of quota  is not an out-of-pocket expense  for all producers,  but for new
entrants the cost of quota is a major expense.
Historically,  quota holders have benefitted from the rising value of quota.  Over the
past  10 years, the value of Ontario's used industrial milk quota has increased at a compound
rate  of 5.3 percent per year.  At 1993  quota values, this represents a capital  gain of $370
million,  or $5/hl.  If capital gains are taken into account, the gross return to non-quota assets
rises to $2,582 million - still less than under free trade assumptions.
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The results presented in Table 8 are  contingent on the assumptions  made about the
base parameters.  In the remainder  of this  section,  the sensitivity  of the results  to these
assumptions  are examined.  The focus of the sensitivity analysis  is on three variables.  The
first of the three variables is Canada's net exports of dairy products.  Net exports captures
both supply and demand changes  in a single  indicator.  In both Base scenarios and under the
current policy, net exports are close to zero.  The other two variables reported are Canada's
industrial  and blend  milk  prices.  Industrial  and  blend  milk  prices  show how  the  base
parameter assumptions  influence the returns received by Canadian dairy producers.  Under
the Base assumptions Canada's  industrial milk price  is either at,  or close to, the export floor
price of $34/hl.  Sensitivity analysis is conducted  on six parameters:  1) the marginal cost of
production;  2)  the  shut-down  price;  3)  the milk  supply  elasticity;  4)  the milk  demand
elasticities;  5) the  industrial milk processing  margin; and 6) U.S.  milk prices.
Sensitivity Analysis:  Marginal  Cost of Production
Figure 2 describes the effect of increasing  marginal cost to $45/hl from $30/hl while
holding the  shut-down  price  at  $22/hl.  This corresponds  to  a situation  where  "average"
production costs change, but the costs of the most efficient producers are held constant at a
low level.  In all cases, the  assumed marginal cost is imposed on the milk supply curve at 74
mhl.
Figure  2 illustrates that at marginal  costs below $32/hl, Canada is a small net exporter
of dairy products.  At marginal costs of production between $33/hl and $38/hl Canada is self
sufficient.  Marginal  costs above $38/hl imply that Canada begins to import dairy products.
If Canada's marginal  cost, at 74 mhl, is  as high as $45/hl then Canada would import  11.56
mhl of dairy products.  An import level  of 11.56  mhl of dairy products represents  15 percent
of domestic consumption.  As  a consequence  of higher marginal costs, milk production  in
Canada would drop to 65.3  mhl from 74 mhl (-11.8%).
Figure 2.  Net  Exports  at Various  Values  for Canada's Marginal Cost:  Holding
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Figure 3 shows  the evolution of the industrial milk and blend milk prices as marginal
costs increase.  The  industrial milk price starts at the export floor price ($34/hl) and rises to
the  import  ceiling price($40/hl)  by the time marginal costs  reach $39/hl.  The blend milk
price illustrates the effect of assuming that Canada always  supplies the fluid milk market at
the import ceiling price of $43/hl.
Figure 3.  Industrial  and  Blend  Milk  Price  as  Canada's  Marginal  Cost  Varies
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In  the  next  scenario  the  $11/hi  difference  between  the  shut-down  price  and  the
marginal  cost  is  maintained  rather  than holding the  shut-down  price  at $22/hl,  as  in the
previous  scenario.  As marginal  costs are increased from $30 to $45/hl the shut-down price
is increased to $34 from $19/hi.  The outcome  is illustrated  in Figure  4 and Figure 5.  In this
situation, Canada begins to import dairy products at a marginal cost of  $39/hl and by the time
marginal  costs  reach  $45/hl  net imports  equal  13  mhl,  about  1.5  mhl  more  than  in the
previous scenario, which maintained  a lower shut-down price.
Figure 4.  Net Exports at Various Values  for Canada's Marginal Cost: Shut-Down
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Figure 5.  Industrial Milk  and  Blend  Price  as  Canada's Marginal  Cost  Varies
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In the final marginal cost scenario it is assumed the shut-down price is only six dollars
below the marginal cost instead of eleven dollars.  Again, the shut-down price is allowed to
increase  with  the marginal  cost,  always remaining  $6/hl  below  the illustrated  value  of
marginal  cost in Figure  6 and Figure  7.  By the time marginal cost reaches $45/hl and the
shut-down price $39/hl,  Canada becomes a net importer of 18.6 mhl of dairy products.  Milk
output declines to 58.3  mhl, a decline of 21.2 percent from current levels.
Figure 6.  Net Exports at Various Values  of Canada's Marginal Cost: Shut-Down
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Figure 7.  Industrial Milk  and  Blend  Price  as  Canada's  Marginal  Cost  Varies
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Sensitivity  Analysis:  Shut-Down  Price
In this scenario, the shut-down price is varied from $20/hl to $28/hl while holding the
marginal  cost at $33/hl.  Variations  over  this range maintain  Canada's no trade position.
Moreover,  variations in the shut-down price have little effect  on the industrial or blend milk
price.  Total milk output varies  from 79.1  mhl with a shut-down price of $20/hl, to 78.9 mhl
with a shut-down  price of $28/hl.  The small response of supply to the shut-down price is not
surprising since the  supply inducing price is above the assumed marginal cost.
Sensitivity Analysis:  Supply Elasticity
In Figure  8, the  supply elasticity  is varied  from 0.5 to 2.0 holding the marginal cost
and shut-down price constant at the base values.  The variation in the  supply elasticity  does
not change Canada's no trade position,  but it does influence the autarky industrial milk price.
As  the supply  elasticity  is  increased,  output  expands.  Production  is  78.2  mhl when the
supply elasticity  is 0.5,  and  increases  to  79.6 mhl  when the  supply  elasticity is 2.0.  The
additional output is enough to lower the equilibrium domestic price for industrial milk from
$37.27/hl to $34.27/hl.
Sensitivity Analysis:  Demand Elasticities
Figure 9 shows the effect  on the equilibrium prices of industrial and  blended milk as
the demand elasticities  for industrial milk and fluid milk are varied.  The demand  elasticity
for  industrial milk is varied  from -0.20 to -0.90 (shown) while the elasticity of demand  for
fluid milk is increased  simultaneously  from -0.05  to -0.40 (not shown).  Canada remains in
a no trade situation as quantity demanded increases from 76.1  mhl at low demand elasticities,
.00O
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to 82.9 mhl with large price elasticities.  Over the simulated range of demand elasticities,
the equilibrium industrial milk price rises from $34.00/hl to $37.48/hl.
Figure 8.  Industrial and Blend Milk Price at Various Domestic  Supply Elasticities
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Sensitivity Analysis:  Processing  Margin
The result of lowering Canada's  assumed processing margin to $3.80 from $7.60  is
shown in Table 9  where they  are compared to the current policy base and to Base 2.  The
lower  processing  margin increases  Canada's  demand  for processed  dairy products.  The
lower processing margin also raises the industrial milk price received by producers to $36.17,Proceedings
from $35.41  in Base 2.  Industrial milk demand and milk production both increase about 1.5
mhl in comparison with Base 2 and Canada remains in a no trade situation.
Table 9.  Current, Free Trade Base  2 and  Industrial Processing  Margin Reduced to 50
Percent of Current  Level
VARIABLE
Fluid Milk Demand  mhl
Industrial  Milk Demand  mhl
Total Domestic  Milk
Demand  mhl
Total Milk Supply  mhl
Net Exports of Milk
Products  mll
Fluid Milk  Producer Price  $/hl  $
Industrial  Milk Producer
Price  $/hl  $
Producer Blend Milk  Price  $/hl  $
Price of Fluid Milk, plant
gate
Price of Industrial  Milk,
plant gate
Wholesale  Price of Fluid
Milk,  ex plant
Wholesale price  of
Industrial  Milk Products, ex
plant
US Fluid Milk Price,  import
basis
POLICY
BASE  BASE  2
value  value  %  change
22.57  23.18  2.7
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US Industrial  Milk Price,
export  basis  $/hi  $  34.00  $  34.00  0.0  $
Gross Revenue  from Milk  mil.
Sales  dol.  $  3,461.30  $  2,975.44  -14.0  $
Rental  Value of Production  mil.
Quota  dol.  $  1,248.82  $  0.00  -100.0  $
Gross  Revenue less  Rental  mil.







Sensitivity Analysis:  U.S.  Milk Prices
Figure  10 illustrates the effect on Canada's net exports of dairy products as the  U.S.
industrial milk price increases  from $30/hl  (US$9.50/cwt) to  $45/hl (US$14.25/cwt).  The
fluid milk price remains $3/hl higher.  At U.S. prices below $38/hl (US$12.00/cwt)  Canada
FREE
UNITS  CURRENT  TRADE
-
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is either self-sufficient  or a small net exporter.  If the U.S. price increases to $45/hl Canada
would export 14.7  mhl of dairy products and produce 90.3 mhl, 22 percent more than current
output.  Over  the  range  of U.S.  industrial  milk  prices  from  $33/hl  (US$10.45/cwt)  to
$38.00/hl (US$12.00/cwt)  Canada would be self-sufficient  in milk production.  The effects
on prices  are shown in Figure  11.
Figure 10.  Industrial Milk  and  Blend  Price  as  Canada's Marginal  Cost Varies
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Summary of Sensitivity Analysis
The most striking feature of the sensitivity  analysis is the robustness of a small or no
trade solution.  Only when Canada's marginal cost of milk production is quite high relative
to the U.S.  market price, does Canada become a significant net importer of milk and dairy
products.  Likewise,  Canada  only  becomes  a  significant  exporter  when U.S.  prices  rise
sharply  relative  to Canada's  marginal  cost  of production.  The results  also  indicate  the
importance of taking into account Canada's output restrictions.  Even though Canadian milk
prices fall from current levels in nearly all of  the simulations, Canada's milk production often
expands, or contracts  only modestly.
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Figure  11.  Industrial and Blend Price as the Shut-Down  Price Varies from $20-$28/hl
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It is impossible to capture all of the  subtleties of interregional  trade in a non-spatial
partial  equilibrium model.  In the next  section three studies  of the North American dairy
market are reviewed.  Two of these models are spatial equilibrium models that provide  an
indication of the potential sources and  destinations of product.  In addition,  the importance
of assumptions  in reaching the conclusions taken from the papers  are highlighted.
THE RESULTS  FROM OTHER STUDIES  OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION
Hallberg and Baker use a spatial equilibrium model  of the U.S. and Canadian dairy
markets  to estimate the  impact of freer trade7. The static analysis used by the authors is a
standard approach to assess trade policy alternatives.  Unfortunately,  a fundamental  error in
the  specification  of the  supply  side  of the  Canadian  market  leads  the  authors  to  draw
erroneous  conclusions from their analysis.  The problem  lies in the specification of Canada's
7  In preparing  this review the authors have benefitted from unpublished  comments on
Hallberg  and Baker and Bromfield et al. prepared by Don McClatchy, Agriculture  Canada.
industrial price
l  I
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raw milk supply curve based on observed price and quantity data
8. Production quotas have
the effect of reducing the amount of milk produced at administered prices.  The removal of
tariff barriers  would lower Canada's milk prices but, with the removal of output controls,
milk production might increase.  The possibility of lower prices and higher output is easily
seen in Figure  1.
Hallberg and Baker's results  also rely on the assumption that dairy processing must
occur  in  the  region  where  the  milk  is  produced.  The  assumption  that  raw  milk  for
manufacturing purposes cannot move between regions maybe be realistic under current U.S.
regulations but it is  less realistic under free trade assumptions.  Processing costs can vary
across  regions  and over time.  As  a result,  it may  be advantageous  for processing  to  be
located in some regions  but not in others.
Bromfield,  et al.  estimate the impact on  Canada's supply managed  sectors of free
trade with the United States
9. The effects on farmers,  input suppliers,  processors  and further
processors  are considered.  The study predicts  the economic  impact of the elimination of
import tariffs on milk,  milk products,  poultry and eggs as of January  1, 1996.  The impacts
are analyzed  over the five-year period from  1996 to 2000 to allow for a separation  between
transitional  and longer-run effects.
The  authors  make  several  important  assumptions.  For  milk  and dairy  products,
assumed price  and production impacts  are taken  directly  from  the work of Hallberg and
Baker.  Based  on  these  results, Bromfield,  et al. argue  that  free trade  in  milk  and dairy
products would reduce Canada's producer prices by 25 percent, and milk output by at least
15 percent.  While the estimated price decline seems reasonable,  if the federal direct subsidy
is  eliminated,  it  takes  very  pessimistic  assumptions  about  Canada's  marginal  cost  of
producing  milk  to  generate  significant  output  declines.  Without  significant  declines  in
Canada's milk output there is no way for U.S. dairy imports to fill 20 percent of Canadian
domestic consumption  as argued by Bromfield, et al.
The results of Bromfield, et al. reinforce the notion that producers  and processors  in
all provinces would be  adversely  affected  by  free trade  in milk and  dairy products.  The
annual average loss to the agricultural and food processing sectors,  over the five years, was
estimated to be $3.2  billion.  The annual loss in government revenues over the same period
was  estimated at $3.6 billion.  These loss  estimates  are  based on  the assumption that the
resources (capital,  labour and land) currently  used to produce milk and dairy products would
remain totally idle under trade liberalization.  Roberts has revealed the unrealistic nature of
this assumption  in anything other than the very short run.  In addition, the consumer gains
which would offset the losses to producers and processors  are not discussed fully.  Hallberg
and  Baker, and Doyon,  Pratt and  Novakovic  argue  that  with freer trade,  milk  and  dairy
8  The high price of milk production quota indicates that the quota is binding and
producers are not producing where marginal cost equals the market price of milk.
9  A NAFTA panel ruling in favour of the United States would require that Canada move
more quickly towards freer trade in dairy products but not necessarily to free trade.  An adverse
panel ruling would be followed by further negotiations  (Meilke).
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products may move  in both directions across the border.  However,  Bromfield et al. assume
unilateral trade in dairy products.
Doyon,  Pratt,  and  Novakovic  investigate  the  effects  of two  dairy  trade  scenarios
between  Quebec,  Ontario,  and  the  Northeast  United  States.  In  the  first  scenario,  trade
conditions  are changed to permit the United States  to export yogurt and  frozen desserts to
Canada.  The second scenario  allows  for an entirely  free trade environment.  A competitive,
static, partial  equilibrium, multicommodity,  and multi-region linear programming  model is
used to determine the  effects of the two trade liberalization  policies.  The model  includes
seven dairy products  (fluid milk, frozen desserts, specialty cheese,  dry and condensed milk,
butter,  yogurt,  and  cheddar  cheese),  296 supply points,  184 consumption  points, and  307
processing points.  The solution to the model depends only on marketing costs (transportation
and processing  costs). Economic  agents  are not allowed  to react to variations in output or
consumption prices.
Two fundamental  assumptions drive the results from this model.  First, the quantities
of raw milk consumed  and produced in each region are fixed.  Second, the costs associated
with assembly,  processing,  and distribution, although  different in each region, are fixed in
the assessment of the two alternative trade scenarios.
The results of policy changes on trade patterns are evaluated by comparison to a base
simulation.  The base scenario reflects  trade conditions  that existed before the NAFTA  and
GATT'94 agreements.  With only yogurt and frozen desserts exported to Canada in the first
simulation, Quebec  was adversely  affected in all categories  of dairy products  except fluid
milk.  Ontario's  yogurt  and  ice  cream  sectors  were  also  negatively  affected.  However,
Ontario became  a net exporter of specialty cheese.
The results of the second simulation (free trade) suggest there would be no significant
movement of fluid milk across international  borders.  Quebec relinquishes market share  for
all dairy products  except cheddar cheese and ice cream.  Ontario improves  its trade position
for  all dairy products  except  yogurt and  specialty  cheese.  The  spatial equilibrium  model
documents the source-destination  trade  flows.
The authors conclude that if trade restrictions are lifted on only some dairy products,
new distortions  are  created  which may cause  more  adjustment problems  than  if all trade
restrictions  were lifted simultaneously.
These  three papers illustrate how the initial assumptions made in analyzing  a problem
influence  the  conclusions.  In Hallberg  and  Baker, the assumptions  of:  1) a sharp drop  in
Canadian milk production,  and 2) that processing must occur only in the producing region,
drive  the  result that the  U.S.  exports  significant  quantities  of dairy  products  to  Canada.
Bromfield et al., relying largely  on the price and output predictions of Hallberg and Baker
conclude that free trade would significantly  reduce the welfare of Canada's milk producers
and processors.  Finally, Doyon et al.  conclusions rest on their two initial assumptions:  1)
fixed quantities  of raw milk demanded  and supplied,  and 2)  that the costs associated with
assembly,  processing,  and  distribution  of  milk  and  dairy  products  are  fixed.  These
assumptions sharply limit the extent of adjustments  in milk and dairy product trade, but do
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illustrate how a fixed quantity of milk would be processed and transferred to minimize these
costs.
CONCLUSIONS
Trade flows in milk and dairy products between Canada and United States, with trade
liberalization,  are likely to be small.  In fact, no trade is a real possibility.  For large ranges
of the key parameters driving dairy product trade -no trade was the estimated outcome.  The
no trade finding is largely unaffected by changes  in demand and supply elasticities  for fluid
and  industrial milk,  changes  in milk producers  shut-down price and Canadian processing
margins  for milk products.  However,  if the marginal cost of milk production in Canada is
above the landed price of dairy products from the United States,  then Canada could become
a significant  importer.  Therefore,  future research  should focus on:  1) generating  reliable
farm-level  information on  marginal cost by  farm  size,  and 2)  the  effects of regulation on
average  farm size and cost structures  . It should be emphasized that while no net trade in
milk and dairy products  between Canada and the United States is a possibility, there could
be  significant  intra-industry  trade  in  differentiated  milk  and  dairy  products  with  trade
liberalization.
The base line results indicate that Canada's gross revenues  from milk sales, excluding
the direct  federal subsidy, decrease from $3,461  million to just under $3 billion with free
trade.  However,  the gross revenue under the current policy includes the opportunity cost of
milk quotas worth more than $0.8 million, even after allowing for the expected capital  gains
on  quota purchases.  Since  the  existing  production  quotas  would  disappear  with trade
liberalization,  a pertinent policy question is: should dairy farmers be compensated for the loss
in  quota  value?  Compensation  to Canadian  dairy  farmers  is  an  equity  issue which  the
Canadian government and taxpayers  will have to confront.
Finally,  several  recent  studies  of trade  liberalization  in  milk  and  dairy  products
between  Canada and the United States paint a rather gloomy picture for the Canadian  dairy
industry  in  a  free  trade  world.  The  gloom  is,  to  a  large  extent,  driven  by  unrealistic
assumptions  about the dairy  industry  in Canada.  Predictions  made on  the basis of more
reasonable assumptions  suggest that net trade in dairy  products  between  Canada and  the
United States is likely to be small following North American trade liberalization.
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